In an infinite-horizon, endogenous growth model a capital income cum investment subsidy tax is considered to investigate if distribution of income towards the non-accumulated factor of production (labour) retards growth and if capital income taxes are bad instruments to finance investment subsidies. The paper identifies conditions under which the tax scheme is better for growth than other distorting tax schemes. In the model a 'left-wing' (pro-labour) government acts growth maximizing and distributing income towards labour raises growth. A 'right-wing' (pro-capital) government's preferred policy is not growth maximizing under the tax scheme, but may generate higher growth than its optimal, growth maximizing policy under other tax schemes.
Introduction
Many theoretical models on growth and distributive policies suggest that increasing taxes for redistribution slows down growth. See e.g. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) , Bertola (1993) and many others. This conclusion is reached by the following line of argument: Some taxes are optimal for the private incentive to invest and so optimal for the accumulated factor of production and growth. In comparison, a government that redistributes resources towards the non-accumulated factor of production levies higher taxes, causing lower steady state growth. The result crucially depends on the tax arrangement. Clearly, any policy that subsidizes investment is good for growth as is usually noted by the same authors. That raises the question how the subsidies are financed and what their distributional consequences are. Often capital income taxation is ruled out as a means of subsidy financing as it would defeat the purpose of enhancing growth. As an example see Bertola (1993) , p. 1192. He does, however, analyze the effect of consumption taxes on growth and distribution.
In this paper and within an infinite-horizon, endogenous growth framework it is questioned whether (1) high capital income taxes are always bad for growth, (2) the optimal policies of the accumulated factor of production are necessarily growth maximizing, (3) shifting political power to the non-accumulated factor of production causes higher taxes and lower growth and (4) capital income taxation really does defeat the purpose of enhancing growth.
In the model a capital income cum investment subsidy tax scheme (CICIST) is compared with a wealth tax scheme (WT). The tax schemes are meant to represent two broad classes of tax arrangements that may distort the investors' incentive to accumulate and both serve as metaphors for redistributive mechanisms. For the same assumption with respect to WT and examples of what other redistributive mechanisms WT may capture see Alesina and Rodrik (1991), (1994) . In these papers policies that maximize growth are optimal for the accumulated factor of production. Thus, WT may also serve as a metaphor for models leading to that result. In contrast, CICIST is a metaphor for any redistributive, perhaps accumulation reducing policy that, in addition, subsidizes investment. Thus, CICIST is supposed to reflect the fact that in one way or another some governments subsidize investment more than others.
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In this paper and as is common, the non-accumulated factor of production is identified with labour and the accumulated factor is identified with capital. The model uses an important equivalence result due to Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) by assuming that the tax rate on capital income and for investment subsidies is equal. Thus, the tax scheme is tantamount to a tax on the consumption of the capital owners.
3 Suppose the government provides public inputs to production as models. Hence, the answer to the question above may be negative in more general settings. 2 A society's choice of tax scheme depends on many diverse things such as history, politics, institutions etc. Although the paper argues that tax schemes play a great role in any analysis of the relationship between taxes and growth, an answer to the question why societies prefer one scheme to another one has to remain outside of this paper's analysis.
3 In terms of implementability there are important differences, however. As a consumption tax the government would tax the capital owners' consumption so that a government representing their interests would not necessarily want to use it. On the other hand a pro-labour government may wish to use it. For both governments it would be difficult to determine whether a homogeneous consumption good was bought by a capital owner or a worker. So viewing the tax arrangement as a consumption tax raises various difficulties which do not arise when implemented as a capital income cum investment subsidy scheme. The conditions for the optimality of uniform commodity taxation have e.g. been analyzed by Sandmo (1976) , or Besley and Jewitt (1995) . For recent contributions on the relationship between consumption and (capital) income taxes see, for instance, Krusell, P., V. Quadrini and J. V. Ríos-Rull (1996) or Judd (1999) .
in Barro (1990) . Higher capital income taxes may then be good for the pre-tax return on capital if the public inputs positively affect production. Coupled with an investment subsidy, a 'right-wing' (entirely pro-capitalists') government may want to use the tax scheme. Analogous reasoning holds for a 'left-wing' (entirely pro-workers') government.
The uniform tax rate may be justified as follows: Given everything else a 'right-wing' government would wish to set very low capital income taxes. But higher tax rates may be called for if public services raise the return on capital, and if the government wants to subsidize investment. So setting similar tax rates on capital income and for investment subsidies is a reasonable choice for a 'right-wing' government. Similarly, a 'left-wing' government would wish to set a high tax rate for redistributive reasons. But that hinders investment, and is bad for the growth of wages. Thus, a left-wing government would have to strike a balance between financing investment subsidies and redistribution. Hence, setting similar tax rates is also a reasonable choice for a 'left-wing' government. With these justifications and for simplicity a uniform tax rate on capital income and for investment subsidies is assumed.
In the paper the governments may want to expropriate the capital stock and run the economy more efficiently themselves. As that is rather unrealistic, it is ruled out and each government respects the right of private property.
It is shown that for optimizing capital owners the distorting effect of capital income taxes is removed by the investment subsidy and the positive effect of public inputs to production. The capital income tax only has a negative effect on the capital owners' consumption level. In the economy's market equilibrium steady state growth depends only on the pre-tax return to capital.
In the paper the equilibrium relationship between pre-tax factor incomes and taxes as well as growth and taxes is strictly positive. However, the capital income component of the share of disposable income in total income decreases with taxes while that for the wage component remains fixed. Thus, higher taxes redistribute relatively more income to labour and raise growth. Furthermore, growth is maximized, when the capitalists are taxed maximally. It is shown that CICIST allows for higher growth than WT if -under either tax scheme -a government targets the same ratio of public inputs in production to the capital stock or if the capital owners are sufficiently impatient and a government targets the same ratio of tax revenues to tax base. Consequently, CICIST appears conducive to high growth.
In contrast to most optimal growth models impatience is not necessarily bad for growth in the model and there is a concave relationship between the growth and the time preference rate. As the tax scheme operates like a consumption tax, more impatience raises the capital owners' instantaneous level of consumption and with it the tax revenues, the government channels into production which in turn raise the return on capital and growth. Furthermore, it is shown that the more impatient the capital owners are, the lower the capital income tax rate must be to maintain a given growth rate.
In a public policy analysis it is investigated what tax rates a welfare maximizing government would choose. 4 In the model a time-consistent policy with nonzero capital income taxes is optimal. Furthermore, the optimal 'right-wing' tax policy does not maximize growth under CICIST. As capital income taxes reduce 4 Thus, the paper contributes to discussions on optimal capital income taxation. In that literature some models argue in favour of zero long-run taxes on capital income as, for example, in Eaton (1981) , Hamilton (1987) , Judd (1985) , Chamley (1985 Chamley ( ), (1986 or Lucas (1990) , whereas others imply non-zero taxes as in e.g. Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993), (1997) or Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) . Analyzing the relationship between expenditure (consumption) and capital income taxes Atkinson and Sadmo (1980) identify conditions under which zero capital income taxes may yield first best allocations. On the same relationship, Judd (1999) shows that under more general conditions the optimal capital income tax should be zero on average. However, the generality of his result has been challenged by Lansing (1999) . the investors' instantaneous consumption the 'right-wing' government chooses a tax rate that represents the optimal trade-off between generating high income through raising enough tax revenues in order to raise the return on capital on the one hand while reducing consumption on the other hand.
Interestingly, the capital owners always prefer a wealth tax scheme under which they act growth maximizing. As growth may be higher under this paper's tax scheme, the preferred choice of the capital owners implies that they value the direct tax effect on their consumption level higher than the intertemporal effect of having higher income and consumption in the future. The paper identifies conditions under which the capitalists' preferred tax policies generate higher growth under this paper's scheme than under the wealth tax scheme. Hence, the accumulated factor of production may not choose the growth maximizing tax base and may therefore not act growth maximizing in comparison to a tax scheme where it would actually maximize growth.
Furthermore, if the social planner uses an income cum investment subsidy tax arrangement, placing more social weight on the welfare of the non-accumulated factor of production (workers) raises the optimal tax rate on the income of the accumulated factor of production (capital) and through this the growth rate. Hence, it may not be optimal for high growth to shift all political power to the accumulated factor of production. The result is in direct contrast to what is shown in many models.
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The 'right-wing' government acts like a growth maximizer under the wealth tax scheme. With this paper's tax scheme a 'left-wing' government acts like a growth maximizer. Thus, a switch in tax bases may induce an important switch 5 See e.g. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) . A result similar to this paper's is obtained in Bertola (1993) , but notice that in comparison to a wealth tax scheme taxation of capital income does not defeat the purpose of enhancing growth in this model. in optimal policies. Hence, one may observe an economy with a government that represents only the interests of the non-accumulated factor of production (labour) to distribute income to that factor and have higher growth than an economy represented by a government solely concerned about the welfare of the accumulated factor of production (capital).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model set-up, and derives the market equilibrium. Section 2.1 provides a public policy analysis and compares optimal tax policies. Section 3 draws some conclusions.
The Model
There are two types of many identical, price-taking, infinitely lived individuals who are all equally impatient. The capital owners (k) own capital equally and no labour, and the workers (W ) own labour equally, but no capital.
6 Both groups derive logarithmic utility from the consumption of a homogeneous, malleable good. There are many firms which are owned by the capitalists. Aggregate output is produced by (raw) labour and capital according to a Barro (1990) production technology
where Y t is total output, K t is the real capital stock 7 , G t are total public inputs to production and A is a constant efficiency index, which depends on cultural, institutional and technological development. At each point in time (raw) labour is inelastically supplied and the total labour endowment equals unity, L t = 1.
For simplicity the paper abstracts from problems arising from the depreciation of the capital stock.
The Public Sector. At each point in time the government taxes the capital income of and grants an investment tax subsidy to the capital owning households at the rate θ t . The tax arrangement amounts to a tax on the capitalist owners' consumption, which is implemented as a capital income cum investment subsidy tax (CICST). 8 The government runs a balanced budget at each point in time and uses the tax revenues to provide public services that feed back into production
where the RHS denotes tax revenues net of investment subsidies. By assumption it is impossible to tax all capital income, that is, θ t ∈ [0, 1 − ] where is small.
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7 Alternatively, one may assume that K t is broad capital and that human and physical capital are strict complements. For a justification of the latter approach see, for instance, Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) , p. 416. Both assumptions would allow one to concentrate on the distributional conflict between the accumulated and the non-accumulated factor of production, without changing the paper's qualitative results.
8 Thus, a Ramsey Tax Problem is contemplated. See Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) or Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) , chpt. 12. In order to see the equivalence let q = 1+t c where q is the price consumption goods command in terms of producer prices normalized to be one and fixed. The government taxes consumption at rate t c . Let Y k denote the capital owners' pre-tax income minus pre-tax investment. Then a consumption tax is equivalent to an income cum investment tax if the capital owners' budget constraints satisfy (1
9 A small captures that the upper bound on tax rates, consistent with no tax-induced expropriation, may still be large, that is, it may be close to, but it is less than one. For ease of calculations it is often assumed that → 0 when the effects of maximal taxation are analyzed. Then the reader should bear in mind that maximal taxation in this market economy model with private property is not meant to be the same as outright expropriation.
Letting γ ≡K t

Kt notice that
Gt Kt is constant over time whenṙ t =γ andθ t = 0.
The Private Sector. The firms operate in a perfectly competitive environment, maximize profits, and take G t as given. The capital owners rent capital to and demand shares of the firms, which are collateralized one-to-one by capital.
The markets for assets, capital and labour clear at each point in time so that the firms face a path of uniform, market clearing rental rates for capital and labour.
Given perfect competition the firms rent capital and hire labour in spot markets in each period. The price of output Y t serves as numéraire and is set equal to 1 at each date, implying that the price of capital K t in terms of overall consumption stays at unity. Given constant returns to capital and labour, factor payments exhaust output so that profit maximization implies
where
is constant over time, the marginal product of capital is constant, whereas the wages would grow with the capital stock. Note that the ratio of public inputs to the capital stock has a positive bearing on the pre-tax return on capital and (initial) wages.
The workers derive a utility stream from consuming their entire wages. Their intertemporal utility is given by At each period the capital owners choose how much of their income to consume or invest, and they take the paths of r t and θ t as given. Their instantaneous budget constraint is given by
depends on after-tax capital income minus after-tax investment.
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10 Notice that the budget constraint suggests yet another implementation of the consumption
Rearranging the capital owners solve
The present value Hamiltonian for this problem is
where µ t denotes the current value shadow price of one more unit of investment at date t. The necessary FOCs for the maximization of H(·) are given by equations (5), (6) and
where the transversality condition (9) ensures that the present value of the capital stock approaches zero asymptotically. In Appendix A it is shown that in the
Thus, in the model the growth rate of wealth γ depends on the pre-tax return on capital, because the capital owners have perfect foresight and know that they receive an investment subsidy. In the optimum the distorting effect of capi-
, the term θ tKt may be interpreted as a special form of politically determined capital depreciation allowance which is directly and positively related to the amount invested.
tal income taxation is exactly offset by the accumulation inducing effect of the investment subsidy. The distorting effect is, however, present in the capital owners' instantaneous level of consumption, which follows the rule C
More impatience causes the capital owners to value current consumption more than future consumption, which makes them consume more per units of capital.
Furthermore, an increase in θ t reduces the capital owners' instantaneous consumption per units of capital at each date t. But then consumption grows at
which does not equal γ in general. However, when θ t is constant, then γ = γ c . In that case Gt Kt is constant, so thatγ =ṙ t = 0. This will be the case in equilibrium as shown below.
Market Equilibrium. For arbitrary paths of θ t the economy's resource constraint is satisfied at each date if 
Hence, for arbitrary paths of θ t the equilibrium factor rewards in (3) equal
Notice that r t and η t are continuous, increasing and concave in θ t . Thus, higher tax rates raise the return on capital and (initial) wages. Surprisingly the marginal products depend on preference parameters. But that is, of course, due to the fact that in a model with productive government inputs and a tax scheme that operates like a consumption tax the marginal products should clearly depend on preference parameters. Also, the return on capital is higher the more impatient the investors are. More impatience makes the capital owners consume more per units of capital, which increases the tax revenues that are channelled into production only to raise the return on capital and growth.
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From the production function one verifies for given
since L t = 1. Thus, the economy's resource constraint is satisfied if
But private sector optimality entailsK
and C W t = η(θ t )K t so that the resource constraint is met and the economy is in equilibrium at each point in time. However, over time and for arbitrary paths of θ t the economic aggregates may grow at different rates. Growth will only be balanced when the tax policies are constant over time.
To put more structure on the tax policies consider a government that wants to maximize the growth of any aggregate variable featuring in the overall resource constraint. In Appendix B the following is shown: Clearly, growth maximizing policies are bad for the capital owners as they reduce their consumption to a level close to zero. Hence, for the capital owners it has very different welfare implications whether the government maximizes the level or the growth of their consumption. Another, perhaps more surprising implication is that the paper's capital income tax scheme calls for maximal taxation of the reproducible factor of production, if the objective is to maximize growth of the aggregates above, which are often considered in the literature.
as given from (13). Expressed in terms of total income (=output) and for constant policies one gets
which decreases in θ t . Thus, higher taxes reduce overall disposable income in terms of total income. This reduction is completely due to the capital income component
], because the wage component remains constant at 1 − α. Thus and in relative terms, higher taxes redistribute income towards labour, but they also raise balanced growth, as γ is strictly increasing in taxes.
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Comparison to a Wealth Tax Market Equilibrium. Let technology, preferences etc. be as in this paper with the only difference that the government taxes wealth. In such a framework Alesina and Rodrik show that a constant tax policy is optimal for the governments they consider. Thus, assume that governments pursue constant tax policies. 13 The capitalists' dynamic budget constraint is then given by C k t = (r − τ )k t −k t where τ is the tax rate, levied on the capital owners' wealth. Solving a problem analogous to the one presented above implies
, G t = τ K t and growth is concave in τ . Denote γ(θ) and γ(τ ) as the growth rate under CICIST or WT, respectively.
12 Below and for WT one verifies that ζ(τ ) is also decreasing, but growth is concave in τ . Furthermore, any government attaching social weight to the non-accumulated factor of production will choose τ >τ in which case there is a positive relation between ζ(τ ) and growth. See Lemma 2 below.
13 Dropping time subscripts indicates constant policies from now on. 14 That would imply θ = τ . But
The growth maximizing wealth tax rate is τ = [α(1 − α)A] With sufficient impatience CICIST generates higher growth than WT. The model's tax scheme neither generates an inverted U-shaped (Barro (1990) or Alesina and Rodrik (1994) ) nor a U-shaped relationship (Persson and Tabellini (1994) ) between growth and taxes. Instead, it is strictly positive. The reason is that in terms of growth the positive effect of granting investment subsidies outweighs the negative effect of levying taxes on capital income. In contrast to most optimal growth models (e.g. Cass (1965) or Koopmans (1965) ) impatience (higher ρ) is not necessarily bad for growth in this model. For given tax policies growth is first increasing and then decreasing in the rate of time preference ρ, and maximized if
Thus, for given policy and when ρ < ρ * , growth could be higher if the agents discounted future utility more. In that situation an increase in impatience would raise growth. Furthermore, given that γ is concave in ρ, it is possible that two economies have identical technologies, pursue the same policies and exhibit the same growth performance, although the agents in one economy are more impatient than in another economy. Notice that a higher θ requires a higher ρ * .
Proposition 4 Assume that the tax policies are given. Under the wealth tax scheme growth, γ(τ ), is maximized if ρ is very small. Under the capital income cum investment subsidy tax scheme growth, γ(θ), is concave in ρ and maximized
if the rate of time preference equals ρ * .
The model's tax arrangement is equivalent to a tax on the capital owners' consumption which depends positively on their rate of time preference. Thus, if the capital owners are more impatient, they will choose higher consumption (per units of capital) and that raises the tax revenues available to the government.
The revenues in turn may be used to provide productive services, thereby raising the return on capital and growth .
Thus, there is an interesting trade-off between the tax rate and the time preference rate for given growth. The more impatient the capital owners are, the lower the taxes have to be for maintaining a given growth rate. Again that is due to the fact that more impatient capital owners consume more, but also generate higher tax revenues used for productive services.
Public Policy Analysis
The government cares about the workers or the capital owners. Respecting the right of private property, it chooses taxes to maximize the welfare function
where V 
the policy, which is optimal for the capital owners, i.e. when β = 0, is given by τ =τ , maximizes growth and depends on technological parameters only.
Thus, under WT a government placing more weight on the welfare of the nonaccumulated factor of production chooses a higher than the growth maximizing ('right-wing') tax rate.
For CICIST it is now shown that a government maximizing W (θ t ) chooses a constant policy. Thus, let the government solve
plus the private sector optimality and the equilibrium conditions, which feature in γ t , r t and η t . The last equation implies
γsds . Substitution of the constraints into the objective function (15) implies
Simplification and collecting terms yields
Integrating by parts establishes 
The integral has the structure
θ)dt and for its maximization the necessary Euler equation
F θt − dFθ t dt = 0 is given by − 1 − β 1 − θ t + 1 ρ dγ dr t dr t dθ t +β dη t dθ t 1 η t =
Evaluating the derivatives yields
But the θ t solving this equation depends on constants only so that a time-invariant policy is optimal. Clearly, θ t = 0 does not solve the equation. Thus, the economy is characterized by steady state, balanced growth at the rate γ.
Lemma 3 The government's optimal policy is time-invariant so that the economy exhibits steady state, balanced growth. Zero taxation of capital income is
never optimal under the capital income cum investment subsidy tax scheme.
For constant policies one verifies that
Notice that the optimal tax rateθ = f (α, A, ρ, β) is unique, because W (θ) is concave as γ θθ < 0 so that W (θ) is a sum of concave functions.
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From equation (19) theθ chosen by a right-wing (β = 0) government satisfies
whereτ is the growth maximizing wealth tax rate. The intuition forθ r < 1 is not difficult to understand. On the one hand the right-wing government wants to set a high tax rate, as that is good for the capital owners' income level and growth, which positively affects the capitalists' utility.
On the other hand higher taxes reduce their consumption, which negatively affects their utility.θ r represents the optimal trade-off for this problem.
Whereas under the WT the optimal right-wing policy is independent of preferences,θ r pays attention to technology and the intertemporal preferences of the capital owners. Surprisingly, it is optimal for patient capital owners to be taxed more heavily in the model. The reason is that patient capital owners consume too little, generating not enough tax revenues for productive government inputs in production. To compensate for that the right-wing government chooses higher taxes to obtain the growth rate which is optimal for the capital owners' welfare.
15 To see this notice that
It is an interesting question whether the capital owners are better off under this paper's tax scheme or under WT. In appendix C it is shown that the capital owners' welfare under WT is given by V r (τ ) =
Under CICIST the highest welfare to be obtained by the capital owners is V r (θ r ) and under WT it
Notice that e B = (1 +
.). Then a sufficient
condition for the last inequality to hold is (1 + B) <
Evaluate the last inequality atτ andθ r , which are two numbers, note thatθ r ρ =
α from equation (21) and substitute forθ r ρ above to obtain
Divide byτ , noteτ α = α(1 − α)A, and simplify to get
. Hence,
Proposition 6
The capital owners' optimal policies under either tax scheme imply that they would prefer the wealth tax scheme to the capital income cum investment subsidy tax scheme.
The result may not look very surprising if one recalls that CICIST works like a tax on the capital owners' consumption reducing their utility. However, the growth rate may be higher under the paper's capital income tax scheme. Thus, the result establishes that the capital owners value the direct effect on their consumption level higher than the intertemporal effect of having higher income and so higher consumption in the future.
The right-wing government represents the accumulated factor of production and acts growth maximizing under WT, but does not do so under CICIST. However, for a wide range of parameter values the optimal policy for the capital owners under this model's tax scheme generates higher growth. Thus, even though a right-wing government does not maximize growth under CICIST its policy may generate a higher growth rate than under WT. The proposition casts doubt on models that identify growth maximizing and optimal policies of the owners of the accumulated factor of production. In this model the owners of the accumulated factor of production prefer a wealth tax scheme (Proposition 6) and a government representing their interests acts growth maximizing under that scheme. But that choice is not growth maximizing in comparison to a tax scheme that the accumulated factor owners would not choose and 16 How the simulation was carried out is explained in Appendix D.
under which their optimal policy is not growth maximizing, but may still generate higher growth than under the accumulated factor owners' preferred (wealth) tax scheme (Proposition 7). Hence, the model provides an example that the owners of the accumulated factor of production do not always choose a growth maximizing tax base.
Next, it is shown that an increase in β, that is, an increase in the weight attached to the welfare of the non-accumulated factor of production (workers) increases the optimal θ. If β > 0 thenθ solves (19) so that W (θ(β), β) θ = 0.
Totally differentiate with respect to β to obtain
Concavity of W (θ) entails W θθ < 0. Notice that from (20)
so that any optimalθ is increasing in β. But an increase in β also raises the growth rate since γ θ > 0. Thus,
Proposition 8 An increase in β raisesθ and γ(θ).
This is an important result and in direct contrast to Lemma 2. If the social planner uses the CICIST arrangement, placing more weight (higher β) on the 17 For a similar proof in a different context see Mirrlees (1986) .
welfare of the non-accumulated factor of production (workers) raises the optimal tax rate on the income of the accumulated factor of production (capital) and through this the growth rate. Hence, under CICIST it is not optimal for high growth to shift all political power to the accumulated factor of production.
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From (20) 
Conclusion
Three points are often made in the theoretical literature on growth and distributive policies. First, increasing taxes for redistributive purposes slows down growth. Second, the optimal policies of the accumulated factor of production can be identified with growth maximization. Third, capital income taxation defeats the purpose of enhancing growth when used as a means to finance investment subsidies.
This paper challenges all three points by showing that maximal taxation of the accumulated factor of production may be growth maximizing, the nonaccumulated factor of production may act growth maximizing, and capital income taxes are not necessarily bad instruments for investment subsidy financing.
The model analyzes a capital income cum investment subsidy tax scheme which operates like a tax on the capital owners' consumption. The paper argues that the implementability of the tax scheme can be justified for 'right-wing' and 'left-wing' governments. It is shown that for optimizing agents the investment subsidies remove the distorting effect of capital income taxation. In equilibrium growth depends only and positively on the pre-tax return to capital. Impatience is not necessarily bad for growth in the model and it is growth maximizing to tax capital income maximally. The reason is that the tax scheme operates like a consumption tax. More impatience causes the capital owners to consume more, raising the government's tax revenues that are channelled into production as public inputs, thereby raising the return to capital and growth.
In a public policy analysis the optimal policies under the model's tax scheme are compared with those generated under a wealth tax scheme. The paper implies that a 'right-wing' government does not maximize growth under the model's tax scheme, although it does so under the wealth tax scheme which it prefers. But the capital owners' optimal ('right-wing') policy under the model's tax scheme may generate higher growth than their optimal, growth maximizing policy under the wealth tax scheme. Thus, the paper shows that the preferred policy of the accumulated factor of production is not always good for growth.
Furthermore, it is shown that placing more weight on the welfare of the nonaccumulated factor of production (workers) leads the social planner to raise the optimal tax rate on the income of the accumulated factor of production (capital) and through this the growth rate. Hence, under this paper's tax arrangement it is not optimal for high growth to shift all political power to the accumulated factor of production.
In fact, a 'left-wing' government acts like a growth maximizer in the model.
Thus, a switch in tax schemes may induce an important switch in optimal policies.
The results imply that due to differences in tax arrangements one may observe an economy with a government that represents only the interests of the nonaccumulated factor of production (labour) to have higher growth than an economy represented by a government solely concerned about the accumulated factor of production (capital).
Several caveats apply. The set-up of the model has been highly aggregated.
In reality workers own capital and capital owners supply labour. It would be desirable to know more about how exactly the government achieves targeting personal investment. These and other problems are left for further research.
A The capital owners' optimum
By equation (8) . Then the transversality condition (9) boils down to
. Equations (7) and (8) 
which is a first order, linear differential equation in K t . It is solved as followṡ
rs ds
rs ds 
so that D t and wealth K t grow at the same rate in the optimum. Furthermore, in the optimum instantaneous consumption is determined by the rule
consumption would grow at the same rate as wealth.
B Growth maximizing policies
Recall γ ≡K Notice that the workers' consumption grows at the same rate as wage, capital or total income. All these growth rates are in general time dependent and have the structure γ i (θ t ,θ t , t). A government that wants to maximize the growth of these 
E Iso-elastic utility
Suppose the capital owners have the instantaneous utility function
where the constant σ = 1 ν represents the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
If ν → 1, U (·) reduces to logarithmic utility. A high ν implies a low elasticity intertemporal substitution, low σ. This means that the capital owners like to smooth consumption. In contrast, a high elasticity of substitution implies that the investors are indifferent to the timing of consumption. In that case the agents may defer consumption for a long time while investing in order to consume a large amount at a future date. By restricting ν > 1 such behaviour is ruled out, implying σ ∈ (0, 1). 20 Notice that a high time preference rate ρ implies that the investors value future consumption less than current consumption.
Assume tax policy is constant and the capital owners solve a problem similar to the one in the text under the dynamic budget constraint C k t = (1 − θ) rK t −K t . It is not difficult to verify (see also e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) , chpt. 2.1.2) that the steady state, balanced growth rate in a market equilibrium with arbitrary and constant tax rates is given by
Then the optimal level of consumption is determined by
where K t = K 0 e γt . Thus, σ and ρ have an effect on both the level and growth of the capital owners' consumption. For given θ and r an increase in ρ (more impatience) or a decrease in σ (more consumption smoothing) lower the growth rate and raise the fraction
, that is, the capital owners' steady state consumption per units of capital. Thus, more impatience or consumption smoothing make the capitalists less willing to save for given taxes and given
Gt Kt
and r.
From the balanced budget condition (2) one gets
In equilibrium r = αA (b) 1−α so that b is implicitly defined by
As ( given θ. Thus, the effect of an increase in σ on b and r is generally ambiguous.
However, for sufficiently large ρ it is positive.
Hence, for iso-elastic utility with preference for consumption smoothing, σ ∈ (0, 1), higher ρ or an increase in σ when ρ is sufficiently large would increase steady state growth.
